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NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION v. MOTOROLA,
INC.: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR PROTECTING REAL-TIME
INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
Information is a commodity that commands pecuniary value on
the open market.1 Real-time information is no exception.2 In fact,
real-time information, for obvious reasons, may be the most sought
after, highly prized species of information available.3 The success of
countless business decisions rests solely upon timing; fortunes are
often won or lost depending upon the precise moment a decision is
made. The collection of such time-sensitive data by information
gatherers has earned a value all its own. A recent decision by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, may undermine the
I See generally Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property
Rights, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95-96. Thurow's thesis is that the global
economic landscape has shifted due to the advent of the "information revolution.f Id. at
96. In this post-industrial setting, it is intellectual property that "lies at the center of the
modem company's economic success or failure." Id. at 96. For example, Thurow points
out that during the peak of the industrial age, access to raw materials and the accumu-
lation of capital was the chief determinant to a company's economic success. However,
today's major companies, like Microsoft and Intel, do not trade with tangible assets.
Instead, these modem corporate juggernauts trade and profit from their intangible assets,
such as knowledge. Thurow looks at Bill Gates as 'the perfect symbol" of the new
centrality of intellectual property because, for the first time in history, the 'world's
wealthiest person is a knowledge worker." Id. Noting that "the world's major growth
industries-such as microelectronics, biotechnology, designer-made materials, and telecom-
munications-are brainpower industries," Thurow contends that "[i]f their intellectual
property can be copied easily, they will not be able to generate wealth for their owners
or high wages for their employees." Id.
2 See Thurow, supra note 1, at 95-96. Real-time information, in this context, is
defined as transmissions of information (whether it be market quotations, weather reports,
sports statistics, or otherwise) as the information changes or on a nearly continuous
basis, often as frequently as once every few seconds.
Consider, for example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ('CME"). CME generates
$34.8 million each year from the sale of "time critical" information. The data is consid-
ered time critical because the information retains its value for only a very brief window
of time. For instance, market information at CME is considered stale within five minutes
and is worthless after twenty minutes. William J. Cook, Court Clock Ticking On Delays
of Time-Sensitive Information, CHI. LAw., Jan. 1997, at 59.
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ability of certain businesses, such as securities and commodities
exchanges, to profit from the real-time information they have either
generated or gathered at their own expense.4 Instead of allowing
such businesses to enjoy the fruits of their labor, as public policy
might dictate, the Second Circuit opened the door in National Bas-
ketball Association v. Motorola, Inc. for competitors to "free ride"
on the efforts of an information-gathering party.5
In such case, the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
brought suit against Motorola, Inc. ("Motorola") and Sports Team
Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc. ("STATS") (herein the 'defen-
dants") in connection with the defendants' commercial introduction
of a paging device called SportsTrax which provides real-time infor-
mation about professional basketball games.6 The pager displays
the following real-time information on NBA games in progress: (1)
the teams playing; (2) score changes; (3) the team in possession of
the ball; (4) whether the team is in the free-throw bonus; (5) the
quarter of the game; and (6) the time remaining in the quarter.7
The NBA brought six causes of action against the defendants,
alleging federal copyright infringement, commercial misappropria-
tion under New York common law, false advertising under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, false designation of origin under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, state and common law unfair competition
by false advertising and false designation of origin, and unlawful
communications under the Communications Act of 1934.8 Al-
though the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed five out of the six NBA claims, the court found
that Motorola's conduct violated New York's commercial misappro-
priation law and, accordingly, entered a permanent injunction
against the defendants, prohibiting the future manufacture and
marketing of the SportsTrax device.9
The Second Circuit reversed on appeal, ruling that New York
State's common law tort of misappropriation was effectively pre-
4 National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola and Sports Team Analysis and Tracking
Systems, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter NBA II].
' Free-riding, as the name implies, refers to a situation where a person can obtain a
benefit (or avoid a cost) without paying for it.
6 National Basketball Ass'n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc., 931
F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter NBA I].
7 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 843-44.
8 Id.
9 Id.
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empted by the federal Copyright Act of 1976.1" Thus, the Second
Circuit vacated the injunction against the defendants, altogether
denying the NBA a remedy by holding that STATS' "transmission of
'real-time' NBA game scores and information ... [did] not consti-
tute a misappropriation of 'hot news' that is the property of the
NBA."11
This Comment illustrates that the reach of the Second Circuit's
decision in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc. may
extend much further than sports statistics. In fact, the decision may
affect a number of industries that have developed substantial inter-
ests in the control and protection of time sensitive information and
that disseminate such information for profit. While the Second Cir-
cuit presumably only divested the NBA's control of real-time basket-
ball game information, the court's ruling also threatens the control
stock and commodity exchanges have over the dissemination of
real-time market activity. 2 These industries may no longer rely on
common law misappropriation to protect their intangible property.
In the end, the Second Circuit's decision highlights the inadequacy
of the current system of intellectual property rights. 3
Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of commer-
cial misappropriation under New York common law and discusses
the manner in which it relates to, and is preempted by, the Copy-
right Act of 1976. Part II details the facts, procedural history, and
legal analysis of both the district court and circuit court opinions
that have been issued in the NBA decisions. Part III analyzes how
the Second Circuit's narrow misappropriation ruling in NBA II may
affect the ability of securities and commodities exchanges to protect
their interests in real-time market data. Part IV of this Comment
introduces two legislative models, one linking the patent and copy-
right clause of the Constitution with the interstate Commerce Clause
and the other detailing a modified liability regime similar to the
10 Id. at 848; see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)'(1994).
" Id. at 843.
12 See Cook, supra note 3, at 59.
13 Fundamental shifts in technology and in the economic landscape are rapidly mak-
ing the current system of intellectual property rights unworkable and ineffective. De-
signed more than 100 years ago to meet the simpler needs of an industrial era, today's
intellectual property rights are undifferentiated, one-size-fits-all. Although treating all ad-
vances in knowledge in the same way may have worked when most patents were grant-
ed for new mechanical devices, today's brainpower industries pose challenges that are
far more complex.
Thurow, supra note 1, at 95.
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current regime articulated by section 115 of the Copyright Act of
1976. This Part illustrates how either of these legislative approaches,
when applied, is narrow enough to fulfill our nation's policy of
stimulating the progress of science and useful arts, yet broad
enough to satisfy both the general public interest in free access and
competition and the special public interest in promoting science
and education. Either approach is designed to afford a remedy for
businesses engaged in information product development when such
development is threatened by a "second comer's" appropriation of
information without permission. Finally, the Conclusion
demonstrates that the Second Circuit has narrowed the "hot news"
doctrine espoused in NBA 11 to the point at which it could hardly
be relied on to protect intangible property of fleeting value. Thus, a
new doctrinal approach must be developed to ensure adequate
protection of those information products currently left unprotected
by the traditional, albeit inadequate, intellectual property paradigm.
I. THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
Exclusive rights and protections are granted by constitutional
mandate to those who create intellectual property in order to ensure
that such creators have sufficient incentive to develop their works
and reap reward for their efforts.'" Balanced against the interests of
the creator is the public's right to benefit from the author's cre-
ation." The exact proper balance, however, has proven difficult to
ascertain due to the complexity of the competing interests."6 State
14 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. ("The Congress shall have power ... [t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.').
15 Protection against the misappropriation of intangible trade values insures an incen-
tive to invest in the creation of intangible assets and prevents the potential unjust en-
richment that may result from the appropriation of an investment made by another.
However, the recognition of exclusive rights in intangible trade values can impede ac-
cess to valuable information and restrain competition." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
16 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 15. The purposes of copyright and patent law can be
broken down into two basic ideas: 1) to foster the creation and dissemination of intel-
lectual works for the public welfare and 2) to give authors and inventors the reward
due them for their contribution to society. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15-16 (4th ed. 1993) (cit-
ing REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw 3-6 (1961)) [hereinafter GORMAN & GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES]. While
these two purposes are often seen as related, they are at the same time in direct con-
flict with each other. For ifnstance, it is clear that many authors and inventors would not
[Vol. 64: 2
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and federal courts, wrestling with this issue for the past century,
have acted by severely limiting over time what was once a fairly
broad range of protection of the author's work against
misappropriation by the public at large.'
The tort of misappropriation was initially fashioned as a com-
mon law remedy in an attempt to control commercial piracy.18
Specifically, the tort targeted those who stole non-protectible ele-
ments of a work of intellectual property (i.e., those elements that
were not copyrightable, patentable, or covered by trademark protec-
tion). Often, such non-protectible elements constituted the most
valuable portion of a work. More often still, such elements, al-
though non-protectible, were costly to develop or compile. Upon a
work's initial release to the public, competitors would typically
appropriate these valuable but non-protectible elements and incor-
porate them into a rival work which would be released soon after
the first.'9 As a result of such appropriation, competitors were able
or could not devote themselves to creative works without the prospect of remuneration.
By giving originators access to the economic reward afforded by the market, copyright
and patent protections stimulate the creation and dissemination of intellectual work prod-
ucts. Similarly, copyright and patent protections encourage publishers and other distribu-
tors to invest their resources in bringing those works to the public.
On the other hand, intellectual property law provides limitations and conditions on
the originator's monopoly so that the public may benefit from the originator's creation.
These limitations and conditions on the originator's monopoly include limiting the rights
of the intellectual property owner to certain uses of the work; limiting the term of the
creator's monopoly; and in certain cases requiring some form of notice, registration and
recordation. See generally GORMAN & GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES; see also
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ('The limited scope
of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required
by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest;
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.').
17 See infra note 29.
18 Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright And Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885,
886-887 (1992). Karjala argues that the Supreme Court's rejection of the "sweat of the
brow theory' (the expenditure of hard work or 'sweat is alone a sufficient basis for
copyright protection in a compilation of facts) and its demanding originality requirements
severely limits protection extended to valuable and desirable works which are otherwise
susceptible to commercial piracy. Id. at 889. Karjarla points out while the judiciary
has correctly subscribed to the statutory formality of the Copyright Act of 1976, the
result of recent decisions "runs counter to the basic social policy of providing an incen-
tive for the creation of desirable works" that fall outside the protection of the copyright
statute. Id. at 889. In the end, Karjarla is describing an 'underprotection problem" that
has been 'multiplied many times over" by judicial forays into this area of the law. Id.
'" See Karjala, supra note 18, at 885. Examples of products with inherent economic
value which fall outside the scope of federal intellectual property protection include
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
to undercut prices because they incurred little or no development
costs. At the same time, the original creator was denied the fruits of
his labor (a satisfactory profit margin) that would justify the original
investment.2 Thus, in response to the danger of valuable works
being under-produced because they were left unprotected from
piracy by federal intellectual property law, the common law torts of
misappropriation and unfair competition were created.2
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a cause of
action for misappropriation under the federal common law in its
landmark decision, International News Service v. Associated Press
(the "INS case").22 In this oft-cited case, International News Service
had, among other things, copied news stories from earlier editions
of Associated Press ("AP") newspapers published on the east coast
and wired the facts of such stories to its affiliated papers on the
west coast that directly competed with AP's publications. 23 The
Court held that although the facts of a news story are publici juris
("the history of the day") and, as such, remain outside the scope of
copyright protection24 the appropriation of originator AP's intellec-
tual work-product by competitor, INS, for use in direct competition
with the originator was actionable as unfair competition. 21 More-
over, the INS case is best known for establishing the hot news doc-
trine. The hot news doctrine was designed to protect a news
service's incentive to gather factual information that would other-
wise be unprotected and open to use by others in those situations
where the information would be commercially valuable for only a
brief window of time.26  Essentially, the Supreme Court granted
computer databases, CD-ROMs, and factual compilations, including telephone directories,
stock quotations, news reports, and other works that lack the requisite creative expres-
sion required by section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976. See id. at 886.
o See Karjala, supra note 18, at 885-886.
See id. at 887.
22 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS].
2 See 248 U.S. at 231.
24 See 248 U.S. at 234; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (denying copyright protection to telephone directories that contain
nothing more than limited subscriber information arranged alphabetically because type of
compilation of facts lacks sufficient originality to warrant copyright protection); Id. at
344-45 (quoting Harper & Row Publ'g Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
25 See INS, 248 U.S. at 242.
26
It is to be observed that the view we adopt does not result in giving to com-
plainant the right to monopolize either the gathering or the distribution of the
news, or, without complying with the copyright act, to prevent the reproduc-
tion of its news articles; but only postpones participation by complainant's
[Vol. 64: 2
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news services a limited monopoly over non-copyrightable material
in cases where 1) the material had economic value for a very limit-
ed time, and 2) the appropriators of the information were in direct
competition with the originator."'
The INS hot news doctrine has been severely narrowed by
several states over the years since it was first announced as part of
the federal common law in 1918.28 In fact, the misappropriation
doctrine has been routinely limited to the specific facts of the INS
case.29 New York, on the other hand, is one of the few states that
competitor in the processes of distribution and reproduction of news that it
has not gathered, and only to the extent necessary to prevent that competitor
from reaping the fruits of complainant's efforts and expenditure, to the partial
exclusion of complainant, and in violation of the principle that underlies the
maxim sic utere tuo, etc.
INS, 248 U.S. at 241. In the INS case, Justice Pitney referred to a Supreme Court case
where the quotations and dealings of a board of trade were collected and distributed by
the plaintiff and communicated confidentially to many people who were under contract
not to make the information public. (Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905)). The Court held that 'plaintiff's collection of
quotations was entitled to the protection of law; that, like a trade secret, plaintiff might
keep to itself the work done at its expense, and did not lose its right by communicating
the result to persons, even if many, in confidential relations to itself, under a contract
not to make it public; and that strangers should be restrained from getting at the knowl-
edge by inducing a breach of trust.' INS, 248 U.S. at 237 (citing Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. at 250.)
Justice Pitney also referred to a Seventh Circuit case that dealt with news gathered
and transmitted via telegraph. National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Co., 119 F.
294 (1902). The information in such case consisted merely of a notation of current
events having only a transient value, due to quick transmission and distribution. The
court held that while the underlying facts behind current events are not copyrightable,
the business of gathering and distributing news for profit was a 'legitimate busi-
ness, . . .that entitled it to the protection of a court of equity against piracy.' INS 248
U.S. at 237-238 (citing National Tel. News Co., 119 F. at 299).
27 See INS 248 U.S. at 239-240.
1 "Although the [INS] decision appears to rest on a rationale of unjust enrichment
potentially applicable to a wide range of competitive conduct, subsequent decisions have
recognized that broad application of- the unjust enrichment rationale in a competitive
marketplace would unreasonably restrain competition and undermine the public interest
in access to valuable information., RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 38, at cmt. c.
" Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old; Should We Bury It
Or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. Rev. 781, 790-91 (1994). In this Article, Professor Sease
points out that Judge Leamed Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, refused to recognize
the misappropriation theory articulated by the Supreme Court, except in cases involving
performance rights or news. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp.
490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (plaintiff successfully prevented a broadcasting station from placing
observers where they could see over a fence and rebroadcast Pittsburgh Pirate baseball
games); see also F.W. Dodge Corp. v. Comstock, 140 Misc. 105, 251 N.Y.S. 172 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1931) (finding misappropriation when defendant used plaintiff's confidential
construction news reports as leads or tips for defendant's own reporters).
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has broadly adopted the misappropriation claim into its common
law scheme. For instance, a New York court has found that the
activities of a defendant who received a plaintiff's radio broadcast
over the airwaves and then supplied this broadcast via telephone to
various subscribers constituted commercial misappropriation. In
addition, New York has recognized a cause of action for misap-
propriation where a defendant listened to broadcasts of play-by-play
descriptions of baseball games produced by a plaintiff and then sent
out simultaneous teletype reports of the game to radio stations for
immediate rebroadcast.32 After emphasizing the commercial value
the descriptions of the sporting events possessed and the fact that
the defendant "contributed nothing to the performance nor the
facilities necessary to make the performance or the broadcasts or
telecasts [of the performance] possible," the court ruled that the
defendant engaged in unfair competition by "misappropriat[ing] de-
scriptions from the authorized broadcasts and telecasts of plaintiff's
games."
30 See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols, Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 792, 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 488-89, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (finding misappro-
priation law to be broad and flexible and developed to deal with business malpractices
offensive to the ethics of society).
"' Mutual Broad. Co. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.
1941).
32 National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1955). In
granting relief, the court held that
[pilaintiff is the owner of the professional baseball exhibitions which it produc-
es; and its property rights, as owner of such exhibitions, include the propri-
etary right to sell to others, who desire to purchase and to whom plaintiff
desires to sell, licenses or other rights under which the purchasers are autho-
rized to have their representatives attend such exhibitions, prepare oral and/or
pictorial descriptions of such exhibitions and transmit such descriptions for
broadcast over such, but only such, radio or television station . . . or such
geographical area or areas as may be agreed upon between plaintiff and such
purchasers.
Id. at 777.
" National Exhibition Co., 143 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
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A. Preemption of the Misappropriation Doctrine by the Copyright
Act of 197634
The enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 effectively abol-
ished the dual system of copyright protection that had existed under
the 1909 Copyright Act.3' By including section 301, Congress spe-
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 reads as follows:
§ 301. Preemption with respect to other laws
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright
as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to -
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copy-
right as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not
fixed in any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before
January 1, 1978;
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
in section 106; or
(4) State and local landmarks, historic preservation, zoning, or building
codes, relating to architectural works protected under section 102(a)(8).
(c) With regard to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be
annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2047 ....
(d) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any
other Federal statute.
[Subsections (e) and (f) respectively, refer to the Berne Convention and pro-
vide for preemption of equivalent state laws regarding works of visual art that
are covered by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.]
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
" Under the old dual system, unpublished works were protected by state statute or
common law from the time of creation to the time of publication. See 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D
Literary and Artistic Property, § 3 (1989). Upon publication of the work, state protec-
tion ceased and only federal protection was available. Id.
When discussing preemption of intellectual property, it is important to note the
companion cases of Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) [hereinaf-
ter Sears] and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 376 U.S. 234 (1964) [hereinafter
Compco]. These cases dealt specifically with the conflict between states' right to protect
their citizens' intellectual property rights and the doctrines of federal preemption and the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. For example, in the Sears case, the Supreme
Court held that the State of Illinois could not, under the pretext of regulating unfair
competition, grant rights that were essentially the same as the rights granted under feder-
al patent law for items not patentable under federal law. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232. In
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cifically intended to do away with this dual system and instead
adopt a single federal system of statutory protection.36 Congress
considered the dual system unwieldy, especially in light of new
technological developments that diminished the importance of the
concept of 'publication' as the central factor determining whether
federal law or common law was applicable.37
Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Copyright Act")
mandates that any common law right that is "equivalent" to any of
the exclusive rights of copyright" should no longer be recognized
the Compco decision, the Court denied Illinois the opportunity to provide relief for a
plaintiff whose unpatentable lighting fixture had been copied by the defendant. See
Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38. In its now famous quote, the Sears Court said: *j]ust as a
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other
law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes
with the objectives of the federal patent laws." Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
36 As the House Report states, the preemption principles set forth in section 301 are
"intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to
foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall
act preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between
State and Federal protection.' H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5746.
37 See 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D, supra note 35, at 655; see also J.H. Reichman and Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights In Data?, 50 VAND. L. REv. 51, 64 (1997) (By
the late 1980's, digital technologies and new telecommunications networks had com-
bined to produce 'the greatest changes in the way information is distributed since the
invention of printing by movable type in the fifteenth century.'") (citing Leslie A. Kurtz,
Copyright and the National Information Infrastructure in the United States, 18 EUR.
INTELL PROP. REv. 120 (1996)).
Before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright protection
was secured only after the work was published with sufficient notice and registered with
the United States Copyright Office. This left a gap for works that were fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression, yet still unpublished in the technical sense of the term (i.e.,
manuscripts, letters, diaries, private presentations, and other unpublished material). This
gap of protection was to be filled by individual states through doctrines of common law
literary property sometimes called "common law copyright." ("Section 301 [of the Copy-
right Act of 1976] expressly obliterates 'publication' as the dividing line between federal
protection under the statute and common law protection (the new dividing line being
'creation,' i.e., 'fixation'). Works are protected [under section 301] 'whether published or
unpublished' and indeed whether before or after January 1, 1978." See GORMAN &
GINSBURG, supra note 16, at 845.)
Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides as follows:
(A) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship includes the following categories: (1) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, includ-
ing any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovi-
[Vol. 64: 2
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR REAL-TIME INFORMATION
by state courts.39 This new section fundamentally changed the face
of the nation's copyright laws. In contrast to the old dual system of
protection, state level legislatures and judiciaries no longer possess
the authority or jurisdiction to grant legal or equitable rights equiva-
lent to the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act.4" Howev-
er, "[s]tate rules protecting interests outside the scope of copyright,
such as those affording relief against deception, consumer confu-
sion, or breaches of confidence, are not preempted as 'equivalent'
to copyright."41 In other words, as long as a cause of action in a
state court does not invoke any of the rights provided for in the
federal copyright statute, the state court has proper subject matter
jurisdiction to proceed.42 However, if any state claim overlaps with
the federal copyright statute, that cause of action will be preempted
by the federal law.
Section 301(b) of the Copyright Act makes it clear that nothing
in the copyright statute limits the rights or remedies under state
created common law doctrines or restricts the rights of the states to
regulate any subject matter that is not copyrightable as defined by
section 102(a) (the "subject matter requirement") of the Copyright
Act.413 Section 301(b) also does not apply to subject matter that is
not addressed by the exclusive rights provision as defined in section
106 (the "general scope requirement") of the Copyright Act.44
sual works; and (7) sound recordings.
(B) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
39 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
40 75 N.Y. JUR. 2D Federal Preemption § 4 (1989).
41 RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 38 cmt. e; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 15,
§ 16 cmt. c; §39 cmt. c.
42 ("Typical of these state causes of action are breach of contract, tortious interfer-
ence with contract or economic advantage, breach of trust, confidence or fiduciary duty,
trade secret infringement, unfair competition, misappropriation, conversion and
infringement of the rights of privacy and publicity.") Paul Dennis Connuck, When Private
Parties Try To Expand Requirements of Copyright, Patent Laws, N.Y.L.J., August 10,
1998, (Intellectual Property Supplement S2).
11 See Sease, supra note 29, at 798. The "subject matter requirement" includes "orig-
inal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1994).
4 Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides as follows:
Subject to section 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this
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Therefore, it follows that federal preemption of a state misappropria-
tion claim based in copyright will occur if 1) the state law claim
seeks to vindicate rights equivalent to those rights defined in the
general scope requirement of the Copyright Act, and 2) the work to
which the state law claim is being applied is a work which falls
within the subject matter requirement of the Copyright Act.4' How-
ever, if there exists different or extra elements required to allege a
state-created cause of action, then there is no federal preemption as
the right does not fall within the ambit of the general scope require-
ment.46 Courts have employed a so-called "extra element" test to
determine whether a *cause of action is equivalent to a federal copy-
right claim. 47 Claims requiring the pleading and proof of a qualita-
tively different extra element, such as the existence of a trade secret,
can escape preemption, while those claims that seek merely to
enforce the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act, such as
preventing the copying or distribution of a plaintiff's material, are
deemed preempted.48
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individu-
al images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996); see also Sease, supra note 29, at 798; ("The fundamental rights
that the bill gives to copyright owners-the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation,
publication, performance and display are stated generally in section 106.) H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674.
4s NBA I, 931 F. Supp. 1124, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) Congress intended Section 301
of the Copyright Act of 1976 to preempt and eliminate any state-created statutory or
common law rule that is equivalent to federal copyright where such rule would apply to
works covered by the scope of the federal copyright law. See H.R. No. 94-1476.
' NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1147-48 (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COPY-
RIGHT §1.01 [B][3], at 1-11-12 (1984) [hereinafter NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT]).
17 See David Goldberg and Robert J. Bemstein, NBA and Motorola: 'Hot News'
Protection, N.Y.L.J., March 21, 1997, at 3.
, See Goldberg and Bemstein, supra note 47. Congress specifically considered the
tort of misappropriation and discussed it in the House Report: "'Misappropriation' is not
necessarily synonymous with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of action labeled
as 'misappropriation' is not preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right within the
general scope of copyright, as specified by section 106 nor a right equivalent thereto."
H.R. No. 94-1476.
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II. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V. MOTOROLA, INC.49
A. The District Court Decision-NBA I
1. The Facts
The National Basketball Association ("NBA"), a private commer-
cial entity, not only produces, organizes, and markets its member-
ship of twenty-nine professional basketball teams but is further
responsible for producing, organizing and marketing preseason,
regular season and playoff games between its member teams.50 By
virtue of the grant of exclusive worldwide rights to market and
promote NBA games, NBA Properties, Inc. controls and manages
the NBA's intellectual property rights."
The district court accepted the following as findings of fact: (1)
NBA games command "vast commercial value and appeal"; (2) this
"value and appeal is attributable to years of NBA's promotional
investments"; (3) "NBA games achieve the apex of their value while
they are in progress ... such as from broadcasting distribution
licenses and admission fees to the arena"; (4) the NBA has entered
into a number of national and regional license agreements for the
broadcast of live NBA games over television and radio; (5) "the
NBA has a license agreement with TRZ Communications, which
takes audio descriptions of games and distributes them via a 1-800
number to listeners ... [who] are charged a fee in exchange for
which they can select a game currently in progress and hear a play-
by-play broadcast of the game"; and (6) in order to "preserve the
value of its proprietary interest in the information," 2 the NBA im-
poses limits on the dissemination of real-time NBA game data by
entering into license agreements and issuing media credentials that
control and restrain how real-time NBA game data is used by the
media.
Defendant Motorola, on the other hand, develops and markets
paging devices which relay a variety of information "from telephone
numbers to weather reports." 3 Motorola is responsible for manu-
4' NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1124. The district court decision was written by Judge
Loretta A. Preska.
s NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1128 (citing affidavit of Edwin S. Dresser, President of
Television and New Media Ventures for The National Basketball Association ('NBA,).
NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1129.
32 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1129-30.
SI NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1129 (citing the affidavit of Michael Mans, President of
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facturing and marketing the SportsTrax device. 4 Defendant STATS
provides information about sports, "both current and historical," to
the public and to various media entities such as the AP, ESPN, Fox,
Turner Broadcasting, NBC Sports, and a majority of major league
baseball teams."5 STATS gathers and provides the real-time NBA
game data that is broadcast via the SportsTrax paging device.56
The SportsTrax device is marketed as a commercial entertain-
ment product designed specifically for NBA fans to provide "'up to
date information on all National Basketball Association teams,'" in
order to create a "'personal viewing window ... of Pro
Basketball' 57 for consumers. STATS obtains its information from
employees who watch the games on television or listen to the
games on the radio. 8 Score changes, minutes remaining, and other
key statistics are entered into computers and then sent via modem
to STAT's host computer where the data is compiled and reformat-
ted for transmission. 9 This information is then sent via satellite to
various FM radio networks that broadcast the appropriate signal to
the individual SportsTrax devices.60 The SportsTrax device updates
the end-user usually "'within two minutes of the on-court activi-
ty,,,61 providing updates towards the end of a game more fre-
quently than every two minutes-sometimes numerous times per
minute.62
Following a cease and desist request directed toward Motorola,
the NBA and NBA Properties, Inc. bought an action against defen-
dants STATS and Motorola before the District Court of the Southern
District of New York, alleging that the "portable electronic beeper
device" manufactured and distributed by the defendants constituted
infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976, commercial misap-
propriation under New York common law, false advertising and
SportsTrax Products, Inc.).
s NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1129.
s NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1129 (citing affidavit of John Dewan, President and Chief
Executive Officer of STATS at 3).
56 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1129.
57 NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1133 (quoting SportsTrax User's Guide at 2-3).
'a NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing testimony of STATS President and Chief
Executive Officer, John Dewan, Transcript at 466, 468, 473-74).
59 NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing the Dewan Aff. at 473-74).
o NBA II, at 844.
61 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1133 (quoting the SportsTrax User's Guide, at 14).
62 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1133 (citing the affidavit of Michael Marrs, President of
SportsTrax Products, Inc.).
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false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
and unlawful interception of communications under the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.63
2. Legal Analysis
The district court found no violations of the Copyright Act of
1976, the Lanham Act, or the Communications Act. However, the
court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the manufacture
and sale of the SportsTrax device based on its ruling that the
defendants' actions constituted commercial misappropriation under
New York law."4
The district court rejected the NIA's argument that the basket-
ball games, themselves, were copyrightable works of authorship
separate and distinct from the words and images that are broadcast
to viewers and listeners. The district court ruled that NBA games are
not copyrightable subject matter because of the "problematic conse-
quences" that would inevitably result.6s For instance, the court
pointed to the possibility of joint ownership of copyright that might
vest in referees, coaches, "and all other participants whose creative
energies contributed to the NBA game."6 6 If joint ownership were
to vest in this manner, it would greatly impede and unduly restrain
the "potential market of the copyright proprietor since a prospective
licensee would have to gain permission from each of possibly many
performers who might have rights in the underlying work before he
could safely use it."67 Moreover, the district court recognized that
0 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1137-1138. The copyright infringement claim was
brought under 17 U.S.C. § 501; Lanham Act claims were brought under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1995); and the unlawful interception of communications claims were brought
under 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1995).
" See NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1150. ("Turning to the merits of NBA's misappropria-
tion claim, I find that NBA has satisfied its burden of proof that defendants have en-
gaged in unfair competition in violation of New York common law through their com-
mercial misappropriation of NBA's proprietary interests in the NBA games.'); id. at 1140,
1159, 1164.
The court also disposed of defendants' laches and prior restraint defenses at the
outset. NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1138. ('['[he NBA has not unexcusably delayed in filing
and prosecuting this action.' NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1140. ('[D]efendants' prior re-
straint argument is unavailing.' Id.)
65 NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1144 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09 [F] (1996) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1144.
67 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1144 (quoting Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F.
Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
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if plays devised by coaches and executed by players were subject to
copyright, this would result in coaches having to defend infringe-
ment claims when accused of copying other coaches' plays. 8 The
court suggested that the "'more reasonable... construction [is] that
athletic events are subject to legal protection pursuant only to the
right of publicity, misappropriation, and other established legal
doctrines outside the ambit of statutory copyright."'6 9
The district court further noted that there was congressional
deliberation over the application of the Copyright Act to sporting
events. According to the court, the fact that the final version of the
1976 Act did not explicitly protect sporting events was clear indica-
tion that "Congress did not intend to include NBA games within the
subject matter of copyright protection."70
Finally, although the broadcasts of NBA games are admittedly
copyrightable subject matter, the district court ruled that the NBA
"failed to show an infringement of its copyright in the broadcasts of
NBA games."71 Because the defendants copied only the facts and
ideas of the NBA game, which fall outside the ambit of protectibility
as dictated by Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,
infringement was not found to exist.7
3. The Partial Preemption Doctrine
Addressing the question of whether the NBA's commercial
misappropriation claim was preempted by the Copyright Act, the
district court ruled for partial preemption. Specifically, the district
court held that the NBA's misappropriation claim was not preempt-
ed as it related to NBA's proprietary rights in the NBA games. How-
ever, the misappropriation claim was preempted as it related to
NBA's proprietary rights in the broadcasts of NBA games.7
The district court's partial preemption doctrine was based on
federal common law precedent which declares that "Section 301 [of
the Copyright Act of 19761 ... preempts only those state law rights
6 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1144.
69 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1144 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 65, §
2.09 [F], at 2-170.1).
NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1145.
71 NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1145.
72 NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1146 (discussing Feist Publ., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
73 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1147.
[Vol. 64:2
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR REAL-TIME INFORMATION
that 'may be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would in-
fringe one of the exclusive rights' provided by federal copyright
law."74 However, "'if an "extra element" is "required instead of or
in addition to the acts of the reproduction, performance, distribution
or display, in order to constitute a state created cause of action,
then the right does not lie 'within the general scope of copyright,'
and there is no preemption."' "5
Relying on Second Circuit precedent, the district court declared
that "[s]tate law rights which satisfy the extra element test - and
thus avoid preemption- 'include unfair competition claims based
upon breaches of confidential relationships, breaches of fiduciary
duties and trade secrets.' 7  This conclusion was reached by ana-
lyzing the legislative history of the Copyright Act which states that
"state law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under
traditional principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of unau-
thorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the
literary expression) constituting 'hot' news, whether in the tradition-
al mold of International News Service v. Associated Press,. . . or in
the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or financial
databases."77
In NBA 1, the district court ruled that broadcasts of NBA games
are preempted by the Copyright Act because they "fall within the
'subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 and
103.t ' 78 However, because the NBA games (as opposed to the
broadcasts of the games) fall outside the ambit of copyrightable sub-
ject matter as defined by the Copyright Act, "NBA's misappropri-
ation claim, as it relates to the NBA games, is not preempted by 17
U.S.C § 301."79 In other words, the district court reasoned that the
1976 Act preempts any misappropriation claim relating to the
broadcast of the basketball games, but the Copyright Act does not
7' NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1147 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Computer Assocs]. Trade secret claims have
an "extra element" that changes the 'nature of the action so that it is qualitatively differ-
ent from a copyright infringement claim." NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1148 (quoting Com-
puter Assocs. 982 F.2d at 716).
75 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1147-48 (quoting Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 716
(quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 65, at Sec. 1.01 [B])).
76 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1148 (quoting Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 717).
7 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1148 (quoting H.R. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748).
7 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1149 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994)).
7 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1149.
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preempt NBA's commercial misappropriation claim of the games,
themselves, because basketball games are not the type of subject
matter intended for copyright protection. Therefore, the
misappropriation claim was only partially preempted.'
After tracing the lengthy history of the methods of interpretation
of misappropriation,81 the district court concluded that "the quanti-
ty and contemporaneous nature of the information conveyed by
SportsTrax, when viewed together with the other relevant facts ...
is sufficient to constitute commercial misappropriation" as it "erodes
NBA's ability to approach other commercial entities and offer them
the degree of exclusivity in real-time depictions of NBA games that
it could offer in the absence of SportsTrax. Thus, SportsTrax has
affected adversely the value of NBA's real-time game informa-
tion."82 As a result of the defendants' violation of New York's com-
mercial misappropriation laws, the district court enjoined defen-
dants from manufacturing, marketing and distributing SportsTrax but
stayed the injunction pending appeal before the circuit court.
80 NBA I, 931 F. Supp. at 1146.
81 See NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1153-57. Specifically, the Second Circuit discussed
the INS decision, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24
F. Supp. 490 (W.D.Pa. 1938) (holding that defendant should be prevented from broad-
casting play-by-play reports and descriptions of baseball games because plaintiff, owner
of the professional baseball team, had property rights in such news and the right to con-
trol the use thereof for a reasonable time following the games); National Exhibition Co.
v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (granting a permanent injunction against defendant who lis-
tened to plaintiff's broadcasts of play-by-play descriptions of baseball games and sent out
simultaneous teletype reports of the games to radio stations for immediate broadcast and
emphasizing that mere playing of the games and broadcasting of the games did not de-
stroy the property rights of plaintiff or licensees therein); Mutual Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Muzak Corp, 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1941) (holding that defendant be pre-
vented from using a radio receiver to receive plaintiff's broadcast and then to transmit
sound through telephone lines to defendant's customers because the plaintiff expended
large sums of money and effort to obtain the exclusive right to transmit the World Se-
ries game); Madisoh Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 7
N.Y.S.2d 845 (Ist Dep't 1938) (preventing defendant from using depictions of the New
York Rangers and Madison Square Garden in a motion picture because plaintiff had built
up a valuable business licensing both depictions; Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc.
v. Transradio Press Servs., Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937)
(holding that defendant should be prevented from seeking to rebroadcast descriptions of
a boxing exhibition based on plaintiff's broadcast because plaintiff entitled to recoupment
of its expenses of producing the exhibition through the grant of exclusive broadcasting
privileges). The plaintiff's business had been created with large expenditures of money
and resources; therefore any use of the depictions by defendant, without express permis-
sion by plaintiff was found to be an infringement on plaintiff's property right in its good
name.
"I NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1158.
[Vol. 64: 2
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR REAL-TIME INFORMATION
B. The Circuit Court Decision-NBA '83
1. Procedural Setting
The defendant STATS appealed from the permanent injunction
against the SportsTrax device, while the plaintiffs, the NBA, cross-
appealed from the district courts's dismissal of its Lanham Act false
advertising claim.84 The court decided that the only issues that
needed treatment were the state law misappropriation and the
Lanham Act claims.85
2. Legal Analysis
a. The Misappropriation Claim
Judge Winter's opinion began with a summary of the relevant
commercial misappropriation law. To wit: the commercial misappro-
priation claim originated from the facts of International News Ser-
vice v. Associated Press86 and "sought to apply ethical standards to
the use by one party of another's transmissions of events."87 The
Second Circuit opinion noted that pursuant to congressional legisla-
tion, copyright protection was granted to simultaneously-recorded
broadcasts of live events such as sporting events, but no copyright
protection was afforded to the underlying events.8 Moreover, the
Second Circuit stated that "[b]ased on [the] legislative history of the
1976 amendments, it is generally agreed that a 'hot news' INS-like
claim survives preemption. However, much of New York misappro-
priation law after INS goes well beyond 'hot news' claims and is
preempted."89
After affirming the district court's dismissal of the NBA's copy-
right infringement claims with regard to both the underlying games
and their broadcasts," the Second Circuit proceeded to discuss
8' NBA II, 105 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit opinion was writ-
ten by judge Ralph K. Winter.
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 844.
as NBA II, 105 F.3d at 844
16 See INS, 248 U.S. at 215.
,7 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 845.
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 845 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
a9 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 845 (citing H.R. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5748).
o NBA II, 105 F.3d at 845-847.
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and overrule the district court's analysis of the common law misap-
propriation claim. The Second Circuit found the elements of such a
claim to be as follows: (1) the plaintiff generates or collects informa-
tion at some cost or expense; (2) the value of the information is
highly time-sensitive; (3) the defendant's use constitutes free-riding
at plaintiff's expense; (4) the defendant's use is in direct competition
with the plaintiff's product or service; and (5) the ability of defen-
dants and others to free-ride will reduce plaintiff's incentive to
gather information so drastically that its incentive to continue
making the information available would be substantially
threatened.91
In addition, the Second Circuit rejected outright the "partial
preemption" doctrine formulated by the district court, ruling that
"where the challenged copying or misappropriation relates in part to
the copyrighted broadcasts of the games, the subject matter require-
ment is met as to both the broadcasts and the games."92 The Sec-
ond Circuit rejected "the partial preemption doctrine and its anoma-
lous consequences that 'it is possible for a plaintiff to assert claims
both for infringement of its copyright in a broadcast and misappro-
priation of its rights in the underlying event."'93 Further, the circuit
court reasoned that the "[aldoption of a partial preemption doctrine
- preemption of claims based on misappropriation of broadcasts
but no preemption of claims based on misappropriation of underly-
ing facts - would expand significantly the reach of state law claims
and render the preemption intended by Congress unworkable."94
The Second Circuit also tightened the extra element require-
ment mandated to defeat preemption under section 301 of the
Copyright Act. Although conceding that "[c]ourts are generally
agreed that some form of such a [misappropriation] claim survives
preemption,"" the Second Circuit noted that "the 'extra element'
test should not be applied so broadly so as to allow state claims to
survive preemption easily." The Second Circuit declared that "most
of the broadcast cases relied upon by the NBA are simply not good
law."96 Following the reasoning the court advanced in earlier Sec-
91 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 845.
92 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 848.
9' NBA II, 105 F.3d at 848 (quoting NBA 1, 931 F. Supp. at 1150 n.24).
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 849.
9s NBA II, 105 F.3d at 850 (citing Financial Inf., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv.,
Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1986)) [hereinafter Fin].
16 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing Metropolitan Opera Ass'n. v. Wagner-Nichols,
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ond Circuit decisions97 which emphasized the "narrowness of state
misappropriation claims that survive preemption," the circuit court
went on to conclude that "only a narrow 'hot news' misappropria-
tion claim survives preemption for actions concerning material
within the realm of copyright."98
The Second Circuit opinion next proceeded to outline the
central elements to an INS misappropriation claim. 99 The court
held that out of the five elements outlined supra, "the extra ele-
ments-those in addition to the elements of copyright infringe-
ment-that allow a 'hot news' claim to survive preemption are: (i)
the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free riding by
a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product
or service provided by the plaintiff.""°
The court concluded that "Motorola and STATS have not en-
gaged in unlawful misappropriation under the new 'hot-news' test
set out above."1 ' While the court conceded that the NBA's infor-
mation was time-sensitive, this was the only element that was satis-
fied, and, therefore, there were two critical elements missing in the
NBA's attempt to assert a 'hot-news' INS-type claim."°2
The Second Circuit recognized that there are actually three
products produced by the NBA. "The first product is generating the
information by playing the games; the second product is transmit-
ting live, full descriptions of those games; and the third product is
collecting and retransmitting strictly factual information about the
Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) and Mutual
Broad., Inc. v. Muzak, 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419; see also supra note 81.
" See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Fl1,
808 F.2d at 204.
" NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION (4th. ed. 1996) § 10:69, at 10-134 (discussing cases that pre-date the 1976
amendment to the Copyright Act and concluding that after the amendment "state misap-
propriation law would be unnecessary and would be preempted: protection is solely
under federal copyright.").
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852.
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853. "By expressly holding that the defendant in a misappro-
priation case must 'substantially threaten' the 'very existence of the product or service
provided by the plaintiff,' the Second Circuit distinguishes the type of grave market harm
it considers cognizable at common-law from the presumptive damage addressed by the
Copyright Act. In so doing, the court emphasizes that under § 301, misappropriation
cannot be a form of de facto copyright protection for uncopyrightable material.'
Goldberg and Bemstein, supra note 47.
101 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
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games." 3 The court held that the first and the second products
were the NBA's primary business, and the third product was more a
derivative of the first and second." Further, in the Court's view,
"the NBA has failed to show any competitive effect whatsoever from
SportsTrax on the first and second products and a lack of any free-
riding by SportsTrax on the third."' Because "there is no evi-
dence that anyone regards SportsTrax or the AOL site as a substitute
for attending NBA games or watching them on television ... [the
court disagreed] that SportsTrax is in any sense free-riding" off the
plaintiff's product.06 The Second Circuit concluded that "[flor the
foregoing reasons, the NBA has not shown any damage to any of its
products based on free-riding by Motorola and STATS, and the
NBA's misappropriation claim based on New York law is
preempted." 7"
Thus, the Second Circuit not only vacated the injunction en-
tered by the district court and ordered that the NBA's claim for
misappropriation be dismissed but also affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the NBA's claim for false advertising under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.' °8
Ill. EFFECT OF SECOND CIRCUIT'S MISAPPROPRIATION RULING ON
REAL-TIME DATA INDUSTRY
The Second Circuit's ruling on the preemption of the misappro-
priation doctrine by the Copyright Act of 1976 severely checks an
already weakened doctrine. This weakness is best illustrated by the
Second Circuit's discussion in NBA i addressing the three extra
elements that must be present in order to save a hot news misap-
propriation claim from preemption under section 301.1°9 The three
required elements are the time-sensitivity of the value of the infor-
mation, the defendant's free-riding, and the "threat to the very exis-
tence" of the plaintiff's product."0  According to the Second Cir-
103 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
104 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
1-o NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
1- NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853-854.
107 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 854.
106 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 863.
l See NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
11 See NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
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cuit, the other two elements, the value of the information and the
plaintiff's investment in it, are not, themselves, sufficient extra
elements to warrant protection by a state created remedy.111
The Second Circuits's misappropriation ruling in NBA II will
clearly affect areas outside the sports industry." 2 For instance, if
the NBA cannot protect the dissemination of real-time game data,
does it necessarily follow that securities exchanges will no longer
be able to protect the dissemination of real-time market data? Close
scrutiny of the two industries reveals that there exists both differenc-
es and similarities as to how each has protected their information
products. The most common methods are discussed below.
A. Common Law, Statutory, And Contractual Protection of Real
Time Market Data
It is a fundamental principle of copyright law that mere facts
are not the type of subject matter intended for copyright
protection."' However, lists of facts can be copyrighted if the data
is "selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the result-
ing work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."" 4
This suggests that if stock and commodity exchanges do not select,
coordinate or arrange their real-time market quotations in the man-
ner set out by section 101 of the Copyright Act, these quotations
will fall outside the protection of the federal copyright statute.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled continuously that
real-time quotations collected by commodities and securities ex-
changes is a type of property that "is entitled to the protection of
the law.""' Moreover, circuit courts have held that real-time infor-
mation, albeit mere notations of market news, sports scores, and
similar factual information that has value for only a very limited
time deserves protection in the courts of equity because such infor-
mation is marketable commercial product." 6  Despite such rul-
ings, notations of raw factual data, such as lists of quotations, have
been found, more often than not, to be inherently
See Goldberg and Bernstein, supra note 47.
,,2 See Cook, supra note 3, at 59.
,, See Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
"4 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
"' Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S.
236, 250 (1905).
"6 National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (1902).
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uncopyrightable." 7 Furthermore, both the Constitution and the
Copyright Act of 1976 require that writings or work products seek-
ing copyright protection satisfy at least a modicum of creativity and
originality." 8 Considering that lists of raw data do not fall into this
original or creative category, securities exchanges have been some-
what frustrated in their attempts to rely on copyright law to protect
their commercial product." 9
Without a strong copyright leg to stand on, securities markets
and exchanges have traditionally relied on contract law to ensure
that their subscribers could not, without express permission, re-
broadcast or retransmit their real-time market quotations to third
parties, including the public.2 ° The United States Supreme Court
has never reversed its position that "[tlhe plaintiff does not lose its
rights by communicating the result to persons, even if many, in
confidential relations to itself, under a contract not to make it pub-
lic, and strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting at the
knowledge by inducing a breach of trust and using knowledge
obtained by such a breach."' 2'
117 See id. at 300-01.
118 See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 546 F.
Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (lists of contents or ingredients not subject to copyright pro-
tection because they are forms of expression dictated solely by functional considerations);
see also 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (1994) ('In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.'); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Con-
tact (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909 (D.N.J. 1987) (mere listing of ingredients, simple direc-
tion, or catchy phrases deemed non-copyrightable due to lack of requisite creativity);
Magic Marketing, Inc. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986)
(generic phrases printed on envelopes lack the minimal degree of creativity necessary for
copyright protection).
119 Cf. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property §57 (1985) (citing Dow Jones
& Co. v. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
The Dow ]ones court stated:
[Dow Jones Averages ] are not solely functional and are thus missing the
element essential to ingredients. It appears that various academics and financial
analysts are interested in the component stocks' validity as mirrors of market
movement and as reflectors of the nation's industrial history. . . . Due to the
effort and judgment exercised in their composition, and the non-functional
purposes to which they are put, Dow's lists are copyrightable.
546 F. Supp at 116 (footnote and citation omitted).
1"0 See Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. at 250-51.
121 Id.
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The use of contractual models for protection was, and still is, a
convenient method of protecting works of information from being
wrongfully appropriated and disseminated without the permission of
the information compiler. The contractual model works because it
conforms with the ancient free-market principles of supply and
demand. For instance, brokers and traders are often more than
willing to sign subscription license agreements on the proverbial
dotted line in exchange for direct access to up-to-the-second market
data feeds. These subscription license agreements often contain
provisions that demand that the licensee acknowledge the licensor's
property rights in the data.'22 The savvy (perhaps even fortunate)
utilization of raw real-time market data enables securities traders to
make a great deal of money in seconds, and large premiums are
often paid to assure prompt and reliable receipt of such data.'23 It
is important, however, to be aware that the protection afforded by
contract law to the information product may be incomplete. 4
The Second Circuit in its ruling in NBA I placed strict limi-
tations on the kind of commercial misappropriation claim that secu-
rities markets and exchanges might have hoped to have raised in
addressing third party usage for their own profit of exchanges' real-
time quotations. While it is true that stock or commodity exchanges
may possess valuable information and may have invested in the
creation of such information, it is a stretch to argue that a compet-
itor who appropriates this information "substantially threatens" the
"very existence" of the information generated by the exchanges.
:'2 See Daniel T. Brooks, Databases: The New Corporate Asset and Liability, in PAT-
ENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY 20-21 (PLI PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK NO. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Databases]. According to Brooks, "[a]t least as to
copyright interests, [the exchanges] claim a right that does not exist in law." Id. at 21.
I See Daniel T. Brooks, Rights in Data and Databases, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY 52 (PLI Practice Course Handbook No. 7, 1993)
[hereinafter Rights].
124 See William P. Farley, Industry Impact of Feist, in 'FACT' AND DATA PROTECTION
AFTER FEIST 41, 42 (on A. Baumgarten ed., 1991) (arguing that "[t]here is some question
about the enforceability of some forms of contract"); Jane C. Ginsburg, No 'Sweat'?
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 353 (1992) [hereinafter No 'Sweat'] (citing Jane C. Ginsburg,
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1918-22 (1990) (identifying shortfalls of contract and self-help
remedies); Ronald S. Rauchberg, Structuring Contracts for Fact Protection, in 'FACT' AND
DATA PROTECTION AFTER FEIST, supra, at 110-12 (discussing problems with enforcement of
contracts of adhesion)); see also Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 137 ('Even
contract law has significant limitations when mass-marketed information products are sold
to persons not in privity with the makers.').
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Thus, the third element of the Second Circuit's misappropriation
doctrine is not met. Although commentators have noted that in the
absence of copyright protection, the doctrine of commercial misap-
propriation plays a role in the protection of uncopyrightable and
unpatentable formulas, indexes and the like,121 this notion seems
thoroughly discredited by the Second Circuit's decision in NBA II.
B. NBA Il's Affect on Real-Time Information Providers
In the absence of federal intellectual property protection, real-
time information providers must rely upon state law for securing
their work product from uncompensated proliferation by third par-
ties. However, under section 301 of the Copyright Act, once a work
is found to be a work of authorshil3 that comes within the subject
matter of copyright, states are preempted from providing protection
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright" under the federal copyright act. 26
According to recent commentators, the Second Circuit's analy-
sis of the second preemption requirement under section 301, name-
ly, the "general scope" or "equivalent rights" inquiry, is the critical
part of the decision handed down in NBA I!.127 In fact, the analy-
sis "cuts back on the misappropriation doctrine as it has developed
in the eighty years since INS."' 28 As already discussed supra in
Part I.A. of this Comment, courts have traditionally applied the
"extra element" test to determine whether a given cause of action is
"equivalent" to a claim under copyright.' 29 Briefly, this test in-
volves determining whether the cause of action instituted by a
plaintiff asserts a claim invoking significant extra elements which are
not equivalent to the general scope or exclusive rights covered
under federal copyright law.3 '
The Second Circuit moved further than previous courts have
ever ventured in its discussion and subsequent limitation of the
extra element test in the context of misappropriation when it stated
that an INS-type claim must allege and prove not one but three
125 See Gary Myers, The Restatement's Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A
Victory For the Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 701 (1996).
126 See supra Part I.A.
127 See Goldberg and Bernstein, supra note 47.
128 Id.
12 See supra Part I.B.
1" See Goldberg and Bernstein, supra note 47.
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extra elements in order to survive preemption."' The Second Cir-
cuit recognized that this requirement imposes a heavy burden on
the plaintiff and presumably makes misappropriation claims far
more difficult to pursue than they have been in the past.'32 How-
ever, the Second Circuit also noted that previous Second Circuit
holdings have stood for the proposition that the "extra element test
'should not be applied so as to allow state claims to survive
preemption easily"'.'33
In the Second Circuit's view, the elements central to an INS
claim are: (1) "the plaintiff generates or collects information at some
cost or expense;"' 34 (2) "the value of the information is highly
time-sensitive;"' 5 (3) "the defendant's use of the information con-
stitutes free-riding on the plaintiff's costly efforts to generate or
collect it;"' 36 (4) "the defendant's use of the information is in di-
rect competition with a product or service offered by the plain-
tiff;"13 7 (5) "the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of
the plaintiffs would so reduce the incentive to produce the product
or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened."'38
Of the five elements detailed above, the Second Circuit in NBA
II held that three elements (the time sensitivity of the value of the
information, the free-riding of the defendant, and the threat to the
very existence of the plaintiff's product or service) were required to
be proven in order for a hot news claim to survive preemption
under section 301 of the Copyright Act. 39
For example, suppose the plaintiff, a stock exchange based in
New York County, compiles and transmits real-time, up-to-the-sec-
131 Id
132 Id.
13 Id. (quoting NBA II, 105 F.3d 841, 851 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992)).
1- NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 240 (1918); Financial Inf. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 808 F.2d 204,
206 (2d Cir. 1986)).
13s NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 231; FII, 808 F.2d at 209;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 38 cmt. c.
1 * NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 239-40; FII, 808 F.2d at 207;
supra note 22, at 239-40; RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 38 cmt. c.; McCARTHY, supra
note 98, § 10:73 at 10-139).
137 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 240; FI, 808 F.2d at 209).
138 NBA II, 105 F.3d at 852 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 241; FII, 808 F.2d at 209;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 15, § 38 cmt. e.).
139 See Goldberg and Bernstein, supra note 47 (quoting NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853).
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ond raw market data to third parties over the World Wide Web for
profit. The defendant, on the other hand, is an individual seeking to
develop an enterprise exploiting the up-to-the-second, raw market
data obtained from the plaintiff's web-site. The defendant extracts
and rearranges a substantial portion of plaintiff's data before retrans-
mitting the data instantaneously over the web to third parties. The
defendant then openly publishes his data over the web-site for free
in the hopes of attracting sponsors that will pay to advertise on the
site thereby providing revenue for the venture. The plaintiff objects
to the defendant's plan, but the defendant feels that his actions are
perfectly lawful because his counsel informs him that as long as his
retransmissions consist of nothing more than mere recompiled lists
of raw market data, such data is unprotectable by copyright as there
is no originality in the arrangement of the plaintiff's data.
If the plaintiff were to bring a claim against the defendant in
the Second Circuit for commercial misappropriation, the court
would be required to apply the new extra element test to ascertain
if the claim was preempted by the Copyright Act. 4 ' Therefore, in
order for the plaintiff to prevail, the plaintiff has the burden to al-
lege and prove that (1) the economic value of the securities infor-
mation that it collects and transmits to third parties is linked with
the information's timeliness; (2) the defendant is a second comer
who is downloading the plaintiff's data and has entered the market
with a competing product that free-rides on the plaintiff's invest-
ment; and (3) the defendant's real-time securities data service was
such a threat to the plaintiff's real-time data service that the plaintiff
involuntarily withdrew itself from the market because it was no
longer possible for him to recoup his expenses in compiling the
real-time data. In effect, this last element requires that the plaintiff
show that but for the misappropriation doctrine, the plaintiff would
be out of business due to the threat posed by the defendant.
In its analysis of the extra element test, the court will presum-
ably recognize the value of information as being linked arm-in-arm
14" Of course, the misappropriation claim would not be the plaintiff's sole cause of
action against the defendant. Like the plaintiffs in NBA II, 105 F.3d at 841, the plaintiff
in our hypothetical case would likely bring claims based on unfair competition under
the Lanham Act, federal copyright infringement, breach of contract, and breach of related
laws of confidentiality. See NBA II, 105 F.3d at 843-44. If the defendant signed a li-
cense agreement, the plaintiff would likely prevail under the contract law claim. How-
ever, it is important to note again that there are inherent limitations in contract reme-
dies. See supra note 124.
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with the timing of the information. As previously noted, certain
types of securities data retains its economic value for only a very
brief period of time.' Any real-time securities data provider will
have little trouble proving this element to the satisfaction of the
court. However, the second and third elements of the extra element
test pose a difficult, if not unsurmountable, problem for the original
compiler of real-time securities market data.
For instance, if a second comer, such as the defendant in the
above hypothetical, extracts data released by the original compiler
and retransmits the data in a customized format, it is likely that this
newly recompiled and reformatted data product will not compete in
the same market as the plaintiff's data product.'42 Thus, the sec-
ond element of the extra element test, the inquiry as to whether the
second comer has entered into the same market as the originator by
free-riding off the efforts of the originator, is likely to fail.'43 If the
plaintiff fails to prove the second element, such failure, alone, will
defeat a misappropriation claim in the Second Circuit because all
three elements are required to be proven in order for the claim to
survive preemption by federal copyright law.'
Furthermore, if the court goes on to examine the third element,
the court will likely rule that the plaintiff cannot meet his burden of
proof. In order for the third element to be satisfied, proof must be
offered by the plaintiff to illustrate that the effect of a second
comer's free-riding off the efforts of the plaintiff originator effectively
forced the plaintiff from the market. 4 The plaintiff's removal from
the market must be attributable to the fact that the original compiler
of the raw data did not have enough lead time to recoup his invest-
ment costs because consumers are seeking out the second comer's
cheaper data product.146 The second comer, however, may prevail
141 See Cook, supra note 3, at 59.
142 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 69 ("Digital technology also
enables second comers to extract and recombine the originator's data into value-adding
products that improve on the original or that compete in different and sometimes distant
market segments.').
143 See NBA II, 105 F.3d at 853.
144 See supra note 139.
14S See supra note 139.
14 The rules of free market economics strongly suggest that if all other factors are
equal, consumers will naturally seek out the cheaper of two similar or closely similar
products. Second comers who free-ride on the efforts of original data compilers enjoy an
enormous competitive advantage over the originators because they have no costs allocat-
ed to information collecting. This allows the second comer to pass the savings on to the
consumer and offer his product at a cheaper price than the original data compiler. See
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if he targets his data product at a different market than that of the
originator. In other words, the court will likely agree with the prop-
osition that if the two competitors are not directly competing in the
same market, the second corner's cheaper data product cannot
rightfully be accused of being the primary factor that forced the
plaintiff to lift his data product from plaintiff's target market.
While the New York Court of Appeals in NBA !! adequately
dealt with the issues involved in the case (interpretation of sec-
tion 301 of the federal copyright law and synthesization of previous
Second Circuit decisions that have ruled on the preemption issue)
NBA II serves conspicuously to illustrate that current state and feder-
al intellectual property statutes are somewhat deficient. Specifically,
our nation's traditional intellectual property models "often fail to
afford those who produce today's most ... valuable information
sufficient lead time to recoup their investments." 47 In other
words, current intellectual property statutes tend to suppress incen-
tives to create valuable information goods thereby leaving informa-
tion goods chronically under-produced.'48 Clearly, under-produc-
tion of information products is not in society's best interest, and the
policy behind our nation's intellectual property laws ought to be
reexamined. The next part of this Comment explores the possibility
of instituting congressional initiatives that will better reflect the need
to secure limited protection for data compilers whose information
products and services are currently exposed to wholesale and/or
partial uncompensated appropriation.'49
IV. LEGISLATIVE MODELS
Many works that are costly to create but inexpensive to copy
are destined to be under-produced without some form of legal
protection. Legitimate and weighty state and federal interests exist in
protecting the intellectual labor of the public. For example, Califor-
nia and Tennessee retain strong interests in protecting tape piracy in
view of the powerful economic interests that the recording industry
Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 56.
'4 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 55.
I See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 55-56.
149 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 138 ("A plan of action is needed
to resolve the database maker's appropriability problem in a manner that yields net
social benefits over time without irreparably damaging basic science and other important
user community interests.').
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has in those states.' Such interests are effectively thwarted by
recent forays of the judiciary and its taking the position that ideas
and facts are free to be copied, adapted and disseminated, and that
no court is to construe the federal copyright monopoly as inhibiting
that freedom.'
Real-time dissemination of professional sports scores and statis-
tics is no exception. For instance, there are prohibitive economic
costs associated with the production of a NBA game. The
NBA takes advantage of the fact that it has invested the appropriate
resources into creating a professional basketball league and is the
sole producer of all league games. Moreover, the NBA is in the
business of exploiting its investment to the extent that the market
will bear. The fact that real-time professional score updates is a
valuable commodity is not something new, and certainly the NBA
has made moves to capitalize on this information product. This is
clear from its licensing of live television and radio broadcast rights
and also, to a lesser extent, from its plans commercially to introduce
the Gamestats paging device, which was in development at the time
of the litigation of NBA I152
Real-time securities data services and information products are
analogous to the type of information product at issue in NBA !1. The
Second Circuit in NBA II ruled that real-time sports scores were left
naked for appropriation by second comers who could use the infor-
mation created by the NBA as long as the second comer targeted a
different market than that of the NBA's primary market. Therefore, if
a second comer appropriates real-time securities data from the origi-
nal provider, he will escape liability by targeting a different market
segment than that of the original data provider. If second comers
can successfully escape liability by retargeting their market audi-
ence, then such result raises serious questions as to whether an
original information provider enjoys sufficient incentives to generate
new information products.
11 See generally Sease, supra note 29, at 807-08.
151 See generally Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 339-41 (citing Feist v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
..2 See NBA II, 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit recognized
that the NBA's Gamestats product provides information similar to that available through
the SportsTrax product. The Gamestats product "provides official play-by-play game sheets
and half-time and final box scores within each arena,' and "[i]n the future, the NBA
plans to enhance Gamestats so that it will be networked between the various arenas
and will support a pager product analogous to SportsTrax. SportsTrax will of course
directly compete with an enhanced Gamestats.' Id.
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This Comment takes the position that, in the face of growing
judicial resistance to the misappropriation doctrine, Congress must
move authoritatively in the direction of protecting works of informa-
tion property. Only a rudimentary understanding of the capabilities
of digital technologies is needed to realize the "vulnerabilities of
publicly distributed electronic information to market-destructive ap-
propriations."'53 Without a legislative directive from Congress ex-
tending some kind of protection to works of value that are not
covered by the current intellectual property paradigm, the creators
of valuable information property are faced with the unwelcome
possibility that anyone can acquire a significant competitive advan-
tage by extracting an originator's unprotected information and sell-
ing a competitive product. The logical result of the free-copying
policy will no doubt reduce incentives to invest in the creation of
works of true economic value that fall outside the clear ambit of
intellectual property protection. 4
Real-time securities information enjoys enormous demand and
economic value in the marketplace. In fact, recent reports point out
that over $6.5 billion is spent annually to keep the computer termi-
nals of busy brokerage houses "plugged in" to the stock exchange
servers which provide up-to-the-second prices and other data con-
cerning stocks, bond equity and commodities prices, as well as
currency values.' 5 However, the information generated, namely
the raw market data, does not meet the "originality" requirement of
the U.S. Constitution,5 6 much less the "structure, sequence and
organization" test of the Copyright Act of 1976. s Because this
valuable information is currently not protected by federal law, Con-
gress must move decisively to prevent further exposure of valuable
information products to uncompensated proliferation.
Consider the federal law relating to copyright. If the law, de-
spite its constitutional purpose of promoting the progress of knowl-
edge, 8 can no longer ensure adequate incentives to information
153 Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 66.
See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 353.
's See Kurt Eichenwald, Memos Said to Detail Reuters Effort to Obtain Bloomberg
Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1998, at D1; see also Brooks, Rights, supra note 123, at 9-10.
I U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
's Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines a "compilation" as a "work
formed by the collection and assembling of . . . data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work
of authorship." 17 U.S.C. 101 § (1994).
"58 See Cook, supra note 3, at 59.
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gathering, then it is necessary to inquire into the possibility of effec-
tive state law remedies designed to promote similar incentives. Part
I of this Comment illustrated that state law misappropriation doc-
trines had at one time supplied a viable remedy against infringe-
ment. However, following the Second Circuit's determination in
NBA II, federal preemption doctrine now serves to nullify most state
misappropriation claims.
An examination of legislative history suggests that Congress
intentionally moved to supplant the majority of state law claims that
may have existed prior to the Copyright Act. For instance, the
House Report to the 1976 Act states "[a]s long as a work fits within
one of the general [copyright] subject matter categories ... the
[Copyright Act] prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails
to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it, is too minimal or
lacking in creativity to qualify.""5 9
Despite the above, legislative history further reveals Congress'
intention to tolerate certain kinds of state law protection of informa-
tion. The House Report to the Copyright Act goes on to state:
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional
principles of equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropri-
ation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) consti-
tuting "hot" news, whether in the traditional mold of International News
Service v. Associated Press, or in the newer form of data updates from
scientific, business, or financial databases. Likewise, a person having no
trust or other relationship with the proprietor of a computerized database
should not be immunized from sanctions against electronically or crypto-
graphically breaching the proprietor's security arrangements and accessing
the proprietor's data .... The proprietor of data displayed on the cathode
ray tube of a computer terminal should be afforded protection against
unauthorized printouts by third parties (with or without improper access),
even if the data are not copyrightable.1"
This extract from the House report clearly suggests that Congress
recognized the need for some type of state law protection for works
of information falling outside the subject matter of copyright despite
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act which supports the congressio-
nal free-copying policy.
Professor Jane C. Ginsburg has argued that when the judiciary
issues general' statements pointing to constitutional limitations in the
area of protection of disclosed information products, these invo-
119 H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 131 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747.
160 H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5748.
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cations sharply reduce the debate regarding the availability and the
scope of copyright protection for works of information.6 In fact,
such statements serve to "augment the uncertainties concerning
both the availability of state law protection and the authority of
Congress to enact other forms of federal anticopying protection for
these kinds of works." 162 The real question then is how a statute
might be drafted that will not only supply incentives to information
gatherers but also protect the public interest in access to informa-
tion. A properly drafted statute must also survive First Amendment
scrutiny.1
63
A. A Statute Under The Authority of The Interstate Commerce
Clause16
4
Professor Ginsburg makes the logical and cogent argument that
the monopoly granted to authors and inventors by constitutional
mandate clearly implicates interstate commerce. Therefore, it is
possible to "assert that copyrights and patents could be legislated
under the Commerce Clause as well as under the more specific
grant of authority."' 6s Professor Ginsburg concedes that Congress
161 See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 339 ("The ... Court's sweeping
declarations of constitutional limitations on Congress' copyright power put in issue the
respective roles of the Court and Congress in defining not only the contours and key
terms of copyright law, but also the scope of Congress' authority to provide for intellec-
tual property protection under other constitutional sources of legislative power.').
16 Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 339.
16 See Alan J. Hartnick, "Unresolved First Amendment Issues In Motorola Case,'
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 1997 at 5. Professor Hartnick questions whether an INS misappropria-
tion injunction could be reconciled with modem concepts of the First Amendment. ('In-
ternational News Service v. Associated Press (INS) was decided in 1918 before the no-
tion that restrictions on speech by virtue of the First Amendment must be extremely
narrow.'); see also Nothing But Internet, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1155-60 (1997) (argu-
ing that First Amendment concerns provide the strongest constitutional limit on the claim
that sports leagues may assert in real-time game information). But cf. Ginsburg, No
'Sweat', supra note 124, at 385-87 (arguing that proprietary interests in information can
be supported without undue incursion on free speech interests as long as the protection
granted by the proposed statute be limited to claims against commercial copying by
other compilers and access to the information is assured through compulsory or volun-
tary licensing).
164 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have . .. [p]ower to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.").
165 Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 369. The text of article I, section 8, of
the Constitution authorizes Congress both to "promote the Progress of Science and Use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
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may not have the power to supplant constitutional limitations by
adopting a form of statutory protection of uncopyrightable informa-
tion under the Commerce Clause that is coextensive with copyright
protection. 6 " However, there is a strong argument that Congress
has the power to enact a misappropriation statute under the Com-
merce Clause "if the statute sets forth a scheme of protection
qualitatively different from a copyright regime"." 7
The central issue to be resolved before this approach is adopt-
ed is whether Congress or the judiciary has the power to implement
the terms of the patent and copyright clause. The strongly worded
decisions being handed down from all levels of our nation's courts
seem to indicate that the judiciary has taken the most active role in
interpreting the purview of the constitutional intellectual property
scheme.168 However, the judiciary's forceful approach toward in-
terpretation of the patent and copyright clause does not preclude
congressional competence to be actively exerted in this area.'69 As
Professor Ginsburg points out, Congress should have ample discre-
tion in accomplishing its constitutional mandate of promoting the
"progress of science." 7" Moreover, Congress' determination of
which work products constitute the "writings of authors" should be
treated as an exercise of fact-finding by the "body most competent
their respective Writings and Discoveries," and to "regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. Professor Ginsburg points out in a footnote that
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 900-914 (1988), was enacted
under both the patent and copyright clause and the Commerce Clause. Ginsburg, 'No
Sweat', supra note 124, 388 n.146.
'" See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat', supra note 124, at 371. Professor Ginsburg points to
the Lanham Trademarks Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1988), as a pertinent analogy. The
Lanham Act provides for the registration and protection of trademarks "used in com-
merce." See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1995) ("The word 'commerce' means all commerce
which may be lawfully regulated by Congress.").
167 Ginsburg, No 'Sweat' supra note 124, at 370-71.
" See e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991);
NBA II, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
169 See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 375 (stating that Congress does not
have the authority to interpret those portions of the Constitution that do not relate to
the separation of powers or individual rights).
170 See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat', supra note 124, at 375 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8; accord Sony Corp. of Am., v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been as-
signed the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly ... in order to give the
public the appropriate access . . . . ); cf. South Dakota v. Dole, Secretary of Transp.,
483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (in exercise of Congress' Article I, Section 8 spending power,
Supreme Court defers to Congress' determination of what constitutes "the general wel-
fare').
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to evaluate the efficacy of the means chosen to promote'the consti-
tutional goal." I"' Therefore, any "Supreme Court review of these
kinds of congressional findings should be extremely
deferential ."172
The Lanham Act, which codifies certain unfair competition
laws, serves as a useful analogy for the type of law that Professor
Ginsburg advocates.. For example, the purpose of the Lanham Act,
which addresses trademark law, is to protect distinctive words and
symbols against copying."73 More importantly, the purpose behind
preventing such copying or imitation of another proprietor's trade-
mark is to limit marketplace confusion as to the source or origin of
particular goods or services. 4 Therefore, because the Lanham Act
is not substantively equivalent to copyright or patent protection, it is
possible to argue that the Lanham Act is dependent upon the Com-
merce Clause. This prevents the Lanham Act from running into
conflict with patent and copyright clause limitations since "federal
trademark law governs conduct different from that at issue in patent
and copyright laws."7"
Congress could follow the same technique used to pass the
Lanham Act and adopt a statute that links wrongful misappropriation
with the Commerce Clause."7 6 As long as legitimate departures are
made from the copyright model, such as differences in the scope of
protection and duration of protection, the statute would presumably
survive preemption from not only article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution but also from the Copyright Act of 1976.17 Moreover, Con-
17, Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 375.
172 Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 375-76 (n the context of the Patent-
Copyright Clause, the [Supreme] Court earlier announced considerable deference to con-
gressional definition of the content and scope of the limited monopoly, stating, for ex-
ample, '[t]he direction of Art[icle] I is that Congress shall have the power to promote
the progress of science and useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive,
the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can only come from Congress.") (citing
to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)); accord Sony
Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429-31.
173 See generally GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 16, at 65-66.
174 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1995); see also GORMAN AND GINSBURG, supra
note 16, at 65 ('[A trademark] is a symbol that represents the reputation or goodwill of
the manufacturer or provider, and signifies the quality of its goods or services.').
17s Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 371.
176 See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 371 ('By the same token, one may
argue that a Commerce Clause-derived statute barring misappropriation of . . . informa-
tion would not conflict with the Patent-Copyright Clause as long as the protective law
departs in significant ways from the copyright model.').
77 See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 371-372. Professor Ginsburg points
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gress could approach a new federal misappropriation statute by
affording more, rather than less, protection than the rights that arise
under the Copyright Act.'78 "For example, if the statute protected
not only against copying information, but against remanipulating in-
formation into a different arrangement or selection, one might em-
phasize the distinction in acts rendered illicit by the copyright law
and by a special [information protection] statute legislated under the
Commerce Clause."'79 These proposed changes from the current
copyright scheme might allow a misappropriation statute to survive
federal preemption.
B. A Statute Adopting a Modified Liability Regime
Another legislative strategy might be to adopt a modified liabili-
ty approach. Some commentators would like to see a new intel-
lectual property regime that would provide those who create infor-
mation products with enough artificial lead time to overcome mar-
ket failure. This would be accomplished by introducing a paradigm
that incorporates a choice of users' liability fees that properly allo-
cates contributions to the costs of research and development among
those users who require the information.8 The users' liability fee
approach would be coupled with a set of ground rules that would
enable second comers, users, and original information providers to
take collective action to modify and enforce the liability framework
eventually adopted.'8 '
out that the duration of statutory protection of information could be made considerably
shorter than copyright protection, which lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years.
Id. at 372. Further, "the scope of protection might be limited by the imposition of com-
pulsory licenses,' which would heighten "the dissimilarities between the proposed ...
information protection statute and the copyright model of 'exclusive Right[s]'." Id.
178 Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124, at 372.
" Ginsburg, No 'Sweat', supra note 124, at 372-373. Under any proposed statute,
liability would arise from copying information, regardless of whether or not the copied
elements of the information are sufficiently original and creative in selection or ar-
rangement. In this sense the proposed statute would not apply to material covered by
the copyright law. See Ginsburg, No 'Sweat, supra note 124 at 373. ("If there is no
overlap in regulated conduct, perhaps the two regimes would not clash, and there
would be no intra-Article I conflict.").
See generally Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 145-51.
8 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 145; see also id. at 147 (recog-
nizing that the menu of user options would need to be "vetted by the industry with
user and govemment inputs.").
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One of the mechanisms that would have to be incorporated
into this approach is a "blocking period" made available to the
original information product provider during which no second com-
er could appropriate either the whole of the contents or any compo-
nent part substantial enough to represent a sufficient threat of mar-
ket failure.82 This blocking period would allow the original infor-
mation product provider to charge what the market will bear, "sub-
ject to public interest limitations favoring science and
education."'83 However, any new regime incorporating such a
mechanism must ensure that the blocking period not be so long as
to prevent legitimate access to the information (a recognized public
interest supported by this Comment), but on the other hand not be
so short as to erect significant entry barriers to the market.4
The second mechanism to be incorporated into this approach
would consist of an automatic license that would be available to
second comers after the initial blocking period expired. 8'A well-
crafted, modified liability regime would oblige the original informa-
tion product provider to license the data on fair and nondiscrimina-
tory terms.'86 The automatic license would entitle second comers
to extract or use the data at issue for any purpose, including direct
competition with the original information product provider, in re-
turn for payment of reasonable compensation according to the
menu of user liability options selected.8 7
This proposed modified liability regime has been analogized to
section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976.188 This section supplies
a compulsory license for the use of musical works on phonorecords
following their first recording.189 This section also itemizes approx-
282 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 145-46.
See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 146.
' See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 147-48 ( Because the goal of a
modified liability regime is to provide artificial lead time while precluding opportunities
for rent-seeking, it is preferable to adopt short rather than long blocking periods ....
Assessing the optimum length of these periods requires further empirical and theoretical
analysis, . . . and there would be no opportunity to perpetuate protection of pre-existing
data.,).
28' See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 148 (arguing that a built-in
automatic license is ideally suited to weak regimes seeking no more than a minimalist,
pro-competitive cure for chronically insufficient lead time.').
6 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 146.
187 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 147.
i 17 U.S.C § 115 (1995).
189 See 17 U.S.C § 115(a)(1) (1995) ("When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical
work have been distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the
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imately twenty involuntary licenses available as a result of industry
negotiation.' The presence of this industry-negotiated base line
allows collection societies to administer voluntary licenses for the
recording of musical works."'
A full discussion of modified liability principles exceeds the
scope of this Comment. Of Course, if Congress were to enact a
statute which would allow similar types of collection societies to
administer compulsory licenses for information products and servic-
es, the base line prices and rules would have to be negotiated by all
parties affected by the statute.'92 According to authors J.H.
Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, the statute need do little more
than remove any antitrust barrier that stands in the way of forming a
collection society and establish a role for government representation
within the society.'93 Meaningful bargaining will result as long as
all parties realize that the original information provider will not be
able to prevent second comers from using the information product
after the initial blocking period has expired, and second comers will
not be able to use the whole or a substantial part of the information
product without contributing a reasonable royalty to the originator's
costs of compilation and dissemination. 94 Working within this
framework, user liability fees can be expected to realistically reflect
market conditions since all parties are at the negotiating table
bargaining out their respective needs. 9
A statute adopting the modified liability approach as outlined
above may be a better choice than the Commerce Clause-based
statute barring misappropriation of uncopyrightable information
discussed supra because the modified liability approach already has
a proven track record. 9
copyright owner, any other person may by complying with the provisions of this section,
obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work.").
o See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 148.
" See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 148 (citing 17 U.S.C § 115
(a)(1), supra note 189).
19' See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 149 ("The task, therefore, is to
bring the different constituent groups to an ongoing bargaining session within the frame-
work of a collection society set up to implement the baseline rules of the modified
liability regime.").
,, See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 149.
' See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 150.
191 See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 150 ("The framework outlined
above also lends itself to the socially important goal of stimulating value-adding uses of
protected data without depriving compilers of a fair return on their investment.").
"9 For example, the Harry Fox Agency, the American Society of Composers, Authors
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CONCLUSION
Under current federal copyright law certain information prod-
ucts are exposed to the risk of out-and-out copying by second com-
ers because the traditional copyright paradigm simply does not
protect these types of works. In light of this fact, several individual
states moved affirmatively to protect information products authored
by its citizens. Such affirmative action took the form of commercial
misappropriation statutes designed and adopted to prevent unautho-
rized borrowing of works which, for various reasons, did not qualify
for protection under the federal copyright law.
However, the Second Circuit in NBA II moved in the opposite
direction. In fact, the Second Circuit's decision narrowed the role
of state-created misappropriation statutes to the point at which these
laws can rarely be relied upon again to protect information prod-
ucts. The court's imposition of a new, more stringent extra element
test requiring that not one but three separate extra elements be
alleged and proven for a hot news claim to survive preemption by
the federal copyright law is a giant step backwards and serves to
further weaken judicial protection of real-time information products.
The result of the Second Circuit's decision risks eliminating, or at
least sharply reducing, the incentives that real-time information
product providers rely on when entering the market. Without limit-
ed but definite protection, such information products run the risk of
being chronically under-produced.
Important policy considerations exist that mandate careful
consideration before the next judicial foray into state intellectual
property law. For instance, recent commentators suggest, and few
would disagree, that the "information revolution" will serve as the
rocket fuel for the United States' post-industrial economy. 97 With-
out adequate means to protect the products generated by the infor-
mation revolution, the very back bone of the nation's economy is at
considerable risk.
and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) are private entities that
operate as collection societies to administer the issuance of blanket licenses and to
distribute royalties on behalf of member copyright owners, based on an industry negoti-
ated standard. See Reichman and Samuelson, supra note 37, at 148; see also Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
197 See Thurow, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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Clearly, the onus is on Congress to prevent such risk from
materializing. Congress should move to enact a carefully tailored
federal anticopying statute that would incorporate some form of
compulsory or voluntary collective licensing. This intellectual prop-
erty paradigm would best address all of the competing interests
involved. For example, this new model would ensure that the origi-
nal compiler has had a sufficient time window to exploit the infor-
mation product to the fullest extent that the market will bear. Bal-
anced against the information compiler's interest would be the right
of public access to the information, which would be guaranteed by
the imposition of a compulsory license provision that would ensure
that the information is distributed fairly and without discrimination
to the general public. This new intellectual property paradigm, if
enacted, has the potential to successfully and reasonably balance all
competing interests, making the future prospects for protection of
real-time information a present-day reality.
Louis Klein
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